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Bursting the bubble of performative allyship:
How moral performance compromises inter-group learning by engendering overconfidence
(Abstract: 744 words)
Allyship, or “action [taken by advantaged group members] to improve the treatment and/or status
of a disadvantaged group” (Droogendyk et al., 2016), can be a powerful tool for reducing
discrimination and inequity in organizations. As a result, research has given ample attention
toward how to enable and motivate dominant group members toward helping those from
marginalized groups (e.g. Bezrukova et al. 2012; Galinsky et al. 2015; Rosette et al. 2013). Yet,
allyship is a continual learning process. Marginalized group members and dominant group
members come to the table with different experiences, concerns, assumptions, and biases. In
order to work effectively toward greater equity, allies must learn from instances when their
efforts miss the mark. Because of this, it is inherently valuable to understand the psychological
and interpersonal process that occur when dominant group members perceive their allyship
efforts as backfiring. As scholarly attention toward allyship has grown in recent years, there is
still scant research on the cognitive, emotional, and behavioral processes that unfold when
attempts toward allyship, genuine or not, fail to have their desired effects (Iyer & Achia, 2020;
Droogendyk et al., 2020; Carton & Knowlton, 2017).
In this research, I suggest that a key obstacle to ally learning is moral performance, or a disparity
between one’s outward image of morality (e.g. organizational membership, hobbies, products
one buys), and one’s internal moral identity (Aquino & Reed, 2002). For those who would
categorize themselves as allies, moral performance can take the form of what is known in lay
terms as “performative allyship,” or when privileged group members engage in activism which
ultimately preserves or enhances their social capital and standing, rather than shifting resources
and status toward marginalized groups (Morris, 2020). In the most pernicious cases, those who
engage in performative allyship may be completely aware that their actions will not help
marginalized groups, and may even harm them. However, I suggest that in many cases,
performative allyship may have less to do with social dominance and more to do with social
approval – in these cases, those who engage in moral performance may come to believe that they
are actually making a difference for marginalized groups (Festinger, 1957). I suggest that this is
troublesome because it creates a false overconfidence in one’s effectiveness as an ally, which
leads to a drop in one’s efficacy as an ally when attempts toward allyship seem to backfire.
Instead of approaching such failures as learning opportunities, those who gained their efficacy
through moral performance are likely to perceive the glass of their image as cracked and be less
sure of how to move forward. These arguments are summarized in the theoretical model in
Figure 1.
These hypotheses will be tested across two studies; Study 1 has been completed and Study 2 (an
experiment) is in the planning stages. Here I describe preliminary findings from Study 1. Study 1
is a cross-sectional survey of MBA students (44% white, 79% male) who self-selected into a
club focused on male allyship. The survey measured instances of allyship backfiring through an
open-ended free response question that was then hand coded, moral performance (taking the
difference between the symbolic and internalized subscales from Aquino & Reed, 2002), ally

self-efficacy (modified from Chen, Gully, & Eden, 2001), and prosocial motivation (Grant &
Sumanth, 2009; as a potential control).
In total, 33.8% (51/151) of participants could recall a specific incident of when they tried to act
as an ally and it backfired. Participants described these incidents, which included both instances
of rebuff from marginalized group members and being discouraged by dominant group members.
There was no direct effect of having an allyship attempt backfire on participants’ self-efficacy as
allies (p = 0.57, b= -0.077, se = 0.135). However, there was an interactive effect between moral
performance and having an allyship attempt backfire on participants allyship self-efficacy (p =
0.027, b = -0.256, se = 0.115). The interactive plot is shown in Figure 2. In line with predictions,
this plot suggests that for those higher in moral performance, self-efficacy as an ally is higher
except for those who had an allyship attempt backfire, who saw a sharp decline in efficacy. On
the other hand, the opposite is true for those lower on moral performance (higher on moral
identification vs. symbolism) – allyship backfiring led to a jump in self-efficacy as allies. These
results include prosocial motivation as a control, as it was correlated with both IV and DV
variables, though results are robust to this control.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Model
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Figure 2: Interaction of Allyship Backfiring and Moral Performance on Allyship Selfefficacy
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